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Background—As the epidemic of Zika virus expands in the Americas, countries across Africa 
and the Asia-Pacific region are becoming increasingly susceptible to the importation and possible 
local spread of the virus. To support public health readiness, we aim to identify regions and times 
where the potential health, economic, and social effects from Zika virus are greatest, focusing on 
resource-limited countries in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region.
Methods—Our model combined transportation network analysis, ecological modelling of 
mosquito occurrences, and vector competence for flavivirus transmission, using data from the 
International Air Transport Association, entomological observations from Zika’s primary vector 
species, and climate conditions using WorldClim. We overlaid monthly flows of airline travellers 
arriving to Africa and the Asia-Pacific region from areas of the Americas suitable for year-round 
transmission of Zika virus with monthly maps of climatic suitability for mosquito-borne 
transmission of Zika virus within Africa and the Asia-Pacific region.
Findings—An estimated 2·6 billion people live in areas of Africa and the Asia-Pacific region 
where the presence of competent mosquito vectors and suitable climatic conditions could support 
local transmission of Zika virus. Countries with large volumes of travellers arriving from Zika 
affected areas of the Americas and large populations at risk of mosquito-borne Zika virus infection 
include, India (67 422 travellers arriving per year; 1·2 billion residents in potential Zika 
transmission areas), China (238 415 travellers; 242 million residents), Indonesia (13 865 travellers; 
197 million residents), Philippines (35 635 travellers; 70 million residents), and Thailand (29 241 
travellers; 59 million residents).
Interpretation—Many countries across Africa and the Asia-Pacific region are vulnerable to Zika 
virus. Strategic use of available health and human resources is essential to prevent or mitigate the 
health, economic and social consequences of Zika virus, especially in resource-limited countries.
Funding Source—Canadian Institutes of Health Research and the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention.
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Introduction
Zika virus is a flavivirus that was first isolated in 1947 from a sentinel rhesus monkey in a 
Ugandan forest,1 with the first human cases identified 5 years later in Nigeria.2 Humans 
become infected with Zika virus mainly through the bites of several species of aedes 
mosquitoes, including Ae. aegypti and presumably Ae. albopictus.3 Eradication of Zika 
virus poses substantial challenges because of its sylvatic transmission cycle between aedes 
mosquitoes and non-human primates.4–8 While Zika virus is known to have circulated in 
parts of Africa and the Asia-Pacific region 1,9,10 a series of epidemics during the past 
decade have transported this virus eastward across islands in the Pacific ocean.11,12 On 
May 15, 2015, the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED-mail) published a 
report confirming locally acquired cases of Zika virus in several northeastern Brazilian 
states, marking the first time this virus is known to have spread within the Americas.
13,14,15 On Feb 1, 2016 the World Health Organization declared this epidemic to be a 
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global Public Health Emergency of International Concern, mainly because of its rapid 
spread between countries, and its vertical transmission of human infection resulting in birth 
defects, including but not limited to microcephaly16–19 and an association with Guillain-
Barré syndrome.20 As of June 27, 2016, autochthonous transmission of Zika virus has been 
confirmed in 40 countries and territories within the Americas.21
As the epidemic expands its range, increasing numbers of travellers are transporting Zika 
virus to distant geographies across the world.22 If competent mosquito vectors become 
infected from these travelers in areas where environmental conditions are conducive to the 
virus’s spread, new epidemics could occur, subject to the presence of an immunologically 
susceptible human population.23 During warmer months across the northern hemisphere 
when mosquito vectors are most abundant, active, and capable of transmitting arboviruses to 
humans, the risk of new epidemics appearing outside of the Americas is expected to peak. 
To support public health readiness, we aim to identify regions and times where the potential 
for health, economic, and social effects of Zika virus are greatest, focusing on resource-
limited countries in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region.
Methods
Overview
To identify the areas most susceptible to Zika virus in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region (ie, 
all of Asia and all Pacific Islands), we performed and integrated a series of analyses. These 
included monthly flows of airline travellers departing from regions of the Americas in which 
conditions are suitable for year-round local transmission of Zika virus (as a proxy for where 
departing travellers are most likely to become infected with Zika virus during the current 
outbreak); monthly climatic suitability models for autochthonous transmission of Zika virus 
in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region, conditional on the predicted occurrence of competent 
aedes mosquito vectors; estimates of the number of people living in countries in Africa and 
the Asia-Pacific region where the potential for mosquito-borne transmission of Zika virus 
exists; and health expenditure per capita as a proxy of countries’ capacity to detect and 
effectively respond to Zika virus importation and domestic epidemic transmission.
Geographic Range of Zika virus in the Americas
Given the high proportion of asymptomatic or subclinical Zika virus infections, combined 
with limited capacity for diagnostics in some parts of the Americas, substantial under-
reporting or delayed reporting of Zika virus infections is widely presumed. Hence, we 
assumed that by July, 2016, more than 1 year after the first cases of Zika virus were 
confirmed in Brazil, the virus was active across all geographical areas in the Americas 
conducive to year-round transmission. To delineate this geographic range, we combined 
continuous distribution maps of Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus,24 regarding both as 
competent vectors, and converted the combined data into binary presence-absence maps. 
The combined geographical range was defined by the minimal extent that incorporated 90% 
of all known independently observed mosquito occurrences. We applied a model of dengue 
virus intra-mosquito dynamics25 to this combined map to assess whether the temperature 
profile for a given geographical range would enable adult female aedes mosquitoes to 
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survive long enough for dengue virus to complete its extrinsic incubation period (ie, to 
enable a newly infected mosquito to survive for long enough to become infectious).25 We 
used the dengue virus model to represent competence of Zika virus transmission because of 
the paucity of data on the extrinsic incubation period for Zika virus and how it varies in 
response to temperature or across aedes mosquito species. Evidence from previous studies 
shows similar extrinsic incubation periods across related flaviviruses.26 We judged this 
approach to be reasonable, because evidence suggests that dengue virus and Zika virus share 
many common epidemiological features, including the same vector species, rate of epidemic 
progression, and general latitudinal and seasonal limits in South America (appendix pp 
1-11). We then paired this seasonal model was then paired with high-resolution empirical 
global temperature data27 to predict the number of days throughout a typical year (average 
year profile 1950-2000) in which local transmission of Zika virus would be possible.28 
These data were then used to map areas where climatic conditions are conducive to year-
round transmission of Zika virus via A aegypti or A albopictus. We subsequently refined this 
geographical range by excluding the USA, since at the time of analysis, there were no 
locally acquired mosquito-borne cases of disease and because the transmission of another 
emerging arbovirus transmitted by aedes mosquitoes – chikungunya – was absent or limited 
in 2014-15 (ie, the USA reported only 12 confirmed cases in Florida in 2014). We refer to 
this geographical extent as the ecological niche for Zika virus in the Americas.
Translocation of Zika virus out of the Americas
We established a 50 km buffer zone around the ecological niche for Zika virus in the 
Americas, to accommodate the potential movement of individuals travelling from areas of 
Zika virus activity to nearby commercial airports. For the 689 cities with one or more 
commercial airports falling within this zone, we analysed worldwide airline ticket sales and 
flight itinerary data from the International Air Transport Association (IATA) between Dec 1, 
2014 and Nov 30, 2015. These itineraries included data on the initial airport of embarkation, 
final airport destination, and where applicable, connecting airports, representing an 
estimated 90% of all passenger trips on commercial flights worldwide (the remaining 10% 
of passenger data are estimates modelled by IATA). We then mapped the monthly final 
destinations of all travellers departing from airports within these buffered zones for airports 
in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region.
Transmission of Zika virus within Africa and Asia-Pacific
Overview—Current evidence suggests that A aegypti and A albopictus are both potentially 
capable of transmitting Zika virus.29 However, the relative competence for each mosquito 
vector is not well understood. To address this uncertainty, we created three scenarios to 
reflect suitability for autochthonous Zika virus transmission in Africa and the Asia-Pacific 
region. We assumed that Zika virus suitability would either be the same as the global 
geographical range for dengue30 (scenario 1; most specific assumption); include the global 
geographical range for dengue, but also include areas where A aegypti occurrences are 
predicted and where conducive climatic conditions exist for autochthonous Zika virus 
transmission (scenario 2; intermediate assumption); or include the global geographic range 
of dengue, but also include areas where A aegypti and A albopictus occurrences are 
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predicted and where conducive climatic conditions exist for Zika virus autochthonous 
transmission (scenario 3; most sensitive assumption).
Zika seasonal suitability maps
To account for seasonal variation in the geographical range of Zika virus suitability, we 
produced maps for each month of the year to delineate our three suitability extents described 
above (figures 1 and 2; appendix pp 1-11). We used mosquito species distribution models for 
A aegypti and A albopictus24 (originally fitted to annual data and covariates) to make 
monthly predictions by use of new monthly covariates for temperature-persistence 
suitability,25 relative humidity, and precipitation. Non-dynamic model covariates (e.g. 
urbanization) were assumed to be constant (appendix pp 1–11). We refined these seasonal 
maps by scaling their values so that the sum of all monthly maps equaled the annual mean 
map.23 This approach allowed us to account for relative changes in suitability throughout 
the year and between regions. The continuous seasonal maps were converted into binary 
range maps for each species. Final monthly vector maps show predictions of areas with high 
likelihood for observation or detection of mosquito populations, which were assumed to be 
sufficiently abundant to enable transmission of disease to humans.
To add spatiotemporal resolution to our predicted Zika virus transmission zones, we used an 
arbovirus incubation period model25,31 to identify regions and times where temperature 
would permit Zika virus transmission to humans (ie, mosquito survival exceeds the extrinsic 
incubation period). Pixels (areas of 5 km²) for which temperature did not meet extrinsic 
incubation period criteria for at least 21 days of the month (ie, assuming that Zika virus 
could be sustained in human populations during days of absence in mosquitoes) were 
masked out of the final predicted transmission zones.
Populations at risk in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region
After defining our three suitability zones for autochthonous Zika virus transmission for each 
month of the year, we calculated the number of people living in each zone by extracting 
population data from LandScan (Oak Ridge, TN, USA), a satellite-based sensor dataset that 
estimates ambient population density worldwide in 1-km2 grids. To link these datasets, we 
resampled our Zika virus suitability zone maps (originally at 5 km2 resolution) 1 km2 pixels 
by use of a nearest-neighbor sampling algorithm and aligned them with national boundaries 
to extract population values. For each country, we estimated the number of people at risk of 
mosquito-borne Zika virus exposure during the month in which the geographical range for 
Zika virus suitability was greatest. We did not make any assumptions about the degree of 
existing Zika virus immunity in populations in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region, despite 
sporadic and historical reports of Zika virus cases from the continent.23 As a proxy for 
healthcare and public health capacity, we ranked countries by health expenditures per capita 
(in 2014 US $) as reported by the World Bank.31
Results
70% of travellers departing from the ecological niche of Zika virus in the Americas for 
destinations in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region arrived in ten countries: China (238 415 
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travellers per year), Japan (179 926 travellers per year), Israel (106 365 travellers per year), 
Australia (96 430 travellers per year), Turkey (90 632 travellers per year), Angola (88 048 
travellers per year), South Korea (87 768 travellers per year), United Arab Emirates (70 848 
travellers per year), India (67 422 travellers per year) and South Africa (59 318 travellers per 
year [appendix pp 94-122]).
Worldwide, an estimated 2·6 billion people live in areas of Africa and the Asia-Pacific 
region where the presence of competent mosquito vectors and suitable climatic conditions 
could support local transmission of Zika virus. According to our most conservative scenario 
(scenario 1), populations living within the geographical range for Zika virus (during the 
month where the geographical range was broadest) were highest in India (1·2 billion 
people), China (242 million), Indonesia (197 million), Nigeria (179 million), Pakistan (168 
million), and Bangladesh (163 million [appendix pp 94-22]). Geographical variability in the 
three suitability zones for autochthonous Zika virus transmission on a quarterly and monthly 
basis is shown for Africa (figure 1; appendix pp 12-24); and the Asia-Pacific region (figure 
2; appendix pp 25-37).
On the basis of the volume of travellers arriving from airports within the ecological niche of 
Zika virus in the Americas, the resident population at risk for Zika virus exposure during the 
month of its broadest activity, and health expenditures per capita, we found that India, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Nigeria, Vietnam, Pakistan and Bangladesh have some of the highest 
expected risks for Zika virus importation and population health impact (figure 3). Although 
China receives the greatest number of travellers of all countries in Africa or the Asia-Pacific 
region and has a large population predicted to be living within the geographical range of 
dengue virus, it spends significantly more on health than do many of the highest risk 
countries. Whereas countries such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, Mozambique and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo have smaller populations at risk of Zika virus exposure, each has a 
moderately high volume of travellers arriving from the Americas and low health 
expenditures (table).
Discussion
By integrating time-dependent analyses on the potential for international dispersion of Zika 
virus and environmental suitability for autochthonous transmission, we aimed to identify 
where and when populations would be most susceptible to the health, economic and social 
effects of Zika virus. In India alone, an estimated 1·2 billion people are susceptible to Zika 
virus exposure at the time of peak seasonal risk. In China, an estimated 242 million people 
live in southern regions of the country where large dengue virus epidemics have occurred 
previously, 33,34 and hence where Zika virus has the potential to circulate locally. However, 
the predicted suitability range for autochthonous transmission by aedes mosquitoes extends 
into northern China, where collectively, more than one billion people reside.24,28 In Africa, 
Angola receives the largest number of travellers from Zika virus-affected countries in the 
Americas, probably because of Angola’s cultural and historic ties to Brazil. In Angola there 
is an historical and ongoing epidemic of yellow fever,34 an arbovirus also transmitted by A 
aegypti, that is already straining the public health system. The epidemiological significance 
of these ties has already been shown in the context of the exportation of chikungunya from 
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Angola to Feira de Santana, Brazil, which has since affected many countries across the 
Americas.34
Although our analysis emphasises the potential for autochthonous transmission of Zika virus 
via aedes mosquitoes, sexual transmission via travellers returning from Zika virus-affected 
areas is now well documented.37 Given the current geographical range of Zika virus within 
the Americas, many travellers returning from affected areas would benefit from health 
education to prevent sexual transmission. For example, since Zika virus RNA has been 
detected in semen 93 days after symptom onset,37 the US Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention have issued recommendations to help to guide individuals in the prevention of 
sexual transmission of Zika virus.21 Although these recommendations could change as new 
evidence becomes available, our analysis of traveller flows from the Americas emphasises 
how populations in specific destinations in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region could benefit 
from intensified public health education.
Our findings must be considered in the context of a number of assumptions and data 
limitations. First, we regarded A albopictus as a competent vector for Zika virus, including it 
in one of our three analytical scenarios, even though our understanding of its capacity to 
transmit Zika virus is evolving.3 Furthermore, we did not account for other Aedes species 
such as Aedes africanus and Aedes hensilli1,8 which might be competent vectors for Zika 
virus in particular geographical areas. We also assumed that the extrinsic incubation period 
for Zika virus in aedes mosquitoes was similar to that of dengue virus, since the extrinsic 
incubation periods for other related arboviruses have been similar.26 In our estimates of the 
public health and health-care capacity of countries, we assumed that health expenditures per 
capita would be a reasonable proxy, recognizing that it will not address variability in 
resources within countries and might not adequately capture the many dimensions that 
comprise a country’s ability to respond to imported or locally transmitted Zika virus.
As an emerging epidemic currently concentrated in the Americas, we were unable to 
validate the outputs of our analysis for the Africa and Asia-Pacific regions. Given that an 
estimated 80% of all Zika virus infections are asymptomatic, and because resource-limited 
countries in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region might have suboptimal surveillance capacity 
to readily detect Zika virus infections, our validation efforts were retrospective and focused 
on the Americas. For example, the predicted arrival of Zika virus into Brazil in 2013 
coincided with a surge in the volume of airline travellers arriving into Brazil from countries 
with reported Zika virus activity.15 Although not formally assessed, the observed spread of 
Zika virus across the Americas has to a largely aligned with the findings of a modelling 
study that used a similar methodological approach to the one used in this analysis.38 At the 
time of writing, the only country in Africa to have confirmed locally acquired infections 
with the Asian strain of Zika virus (identical to the strain circulating in the Americas) is 
Cape Verde. In our analysis, we noted that Cape Verde received more than 7000 travellers 
from Zika virus affected countries in 2015 (ranked 27th of 118 countries), including direct 
flights from northeastern Brazil. Further validation efforts will become possible as more data 
on the observed spread of Zika virus becomes available.
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Finally, the population health consequences of imported Zika virus from the Americas will 
depend heavily on underlying levels of immunity to Zika virus in Africa and the Asia-Pacific 
region. Although sporadic cases of Zika virus have been reported in both continents,23 the 
breadth and extent of previous infection to Zika virus remains unknown. To fill this gap in 
knowledge, serological surveys in Africa and Asia-Pacific are needed. Furthermore, the 
degree and duration of protective immunity stemming from infection with Zika virus is also 
unknown. This point is especially relevant when considering whether previous infection with 
the African strain of Zika virus confers any protective benefit against infections with the 
Asian strain of the virus.
As the Zika virus epidemic in the Americas intensifies and expands, hundreds and possibly 
thousands, of infected travellers are now transporting the virus to distant regions of the 
world. Given the broad global range of aedes mosquitoes and the arrival of summer in the 
northern hemisphere, these translocation events could catalyse new Zika virus epidemics, in 
much the same manner that the epidemic in Brazil began. The potential for epidemics to 
occur in parts of Africa and the Asia-Pacific region is particularly worrying given the vast 
numbers of people who are potentially susceptible to Zika virus and are living in 
environments where health and human resources to prevent, detect, and respond to 
epidemics are limited. Our findings could offer valuable information to support time-
sensitive public health decision-making at local, national and international levels.
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Figure 1. Seasonal geographical suitability for Zika virus transmission in Africa and seasonal 
volume of airline travellers arriving from the Americas
Monthly maps are shown for Africa. Travellers arriving from the Americas refers to 
travellers originating from regions of Latin America and the Caribbean that are suitable for 
year-round transmission of Zika virus.
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Figure 2. Seasonal geographical suitability for Zika virus transmission in Asia-Pacific and 
seasonal volume of airline travellers arriving from the Americas
Monthly maps are shown for Asia-Pacific region. Travellers arriving from the Americas 
refers to travellers originating from regions of Latin America and the Caribbean that are 
suitable for year-round transmission of Zika virus.
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Figure 3. Volume of airline travellers arriving from the Americas by peak resident population at 
risk of Zika virus exposure and health expenditures per capita
The x-axis shows log of the annual volume of travellers arriving from airports within the 
ecological niche of Zika virus in the Americas, y-axis shows the transformation of health 
expenditures per capita (square root of 1/health expenditures per capita), and the size of 
circles shows the populations residing within the geographical range of Zika virus during the 
month of its broadest activity. Travellers arriving from the Americas refers to travellers 
originating from regions of Latin America and the Caribbean that are suitable for year-round 
transmission of Zika virus. Due to highly skewed distribution of values, volume of airline 
travellers was plotted on a logarithmic scale.
Population at risk of Zika virus exposure refers to resident populations living in areas 
suitable for Zika virus transmission during the month when the geographical range of 
suitability is broadest. Health expenditures are measured in 2014 US$; because of highly 
skewed distribution of values, we transformed health expenditures per capita for 
visualisation purposes.
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Table 1
Countries in Africa and Asia-Pacific ranked by monthly volume of airline travellers 
arriving from the Americas and peak resident population at risk of Zika virus exposure
Travellers arriving from the Americas refers to travellers originating from regions of Latin America and the 
Caribbean that are suitable for year-round transmission of Zika virus. Resident population at risk of Zika virus 
exposure refers to resident populations living in areas suitable for Zika virus transmission during the month 
when the geographical range of suitability is broadest. Scenario 1 is Zika virus extent equal to dengue extent; 
scenario 2 is Zika virus extent equal to dengue extent plus Aedes aegypti extent; and scenario 3 is Zika virus 
extent equal to dengue extent plus A aegypti plus Aedes albopictus extents.
Month of 
Peak 
Exposure 
to Zika 
virus
Population at risk during peak exposure 
month [millions]
Traveller 
volume at 
peak 
exposure* 
(number 
of 
travellers)
Health 
expenditure 
per capita 
(US$), 2014
Health 
expenditure 
per capita 
rank (of 
104 
countries), 
2014
Alignment 
of Peak 
travel and 
peak 
exposure†
Rank Country Scenario 1 
(most 
conservative 
scenario)
Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
(least 
conservative 
scenario)
1 India August 1181·6 1181·6 1208·3 5430 75 71 No
2 China July 241·8 969·7 1134·9 19266 419·7 27 Yes
3 Indonesia December 196·9 196·9 227·6 1012 99·4 62 No
4 Nigeria July 178·5 178·5 181·5 359 117·5 59 No
5 Pakistan August 168·0 168·0 172·5 236 36·2 90 No
6 Bangladesh July 162·9 162·9 162·9 106 30·8 94 No
7 Vietnam September 82·7 82·7 85·6 481 142·4 54 Yes
8 Philippines July 70·2 70·2 80·9 3597 135·2 55 Yes
9 Thailand September 59·3 59·3 60·5 1464 360·4 31 No
10 Myanmar June 50·9 50·9 53·4 47 20·3 101 No
11
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo November 47·3 47·3 62·1 105 11·6 104 Yes
12 Tanzania March 35·9 35·9 42·9 567 51·7 80 Yes
13 Sudan August 32·9 32·9 33·0 1 129·8 56 No
14 Nepal July 26·5 26·5 30·2 50 39·9 86 No
15 Uganda April 24·6 24·6 30·4 39 52·3 79 No
16 Mozambique February 23·4 23·4 23·7 568 42 85 No
17 Taiwan July 22·0 22·0 22·3 1259 No data No data No
18 Kenya April 21·7 21·7 28·1 457 77·7 69 No
19 Malaysia November 21·7 21·7 26·9 927 455·8 26 No
20 Ethiopia July 22·4 22·4 44·5 350 26·6 97 No
*
Based on the month when the size of the population exposed to dengue virus was predicted to be greatest
†
Based on alignment of month of peak E=exposure to Zika virus (based on dengue extent) and months with peak travel volumes (defined as top 
quartile)
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